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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

CHRISTOPHER MARK TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No. 39844
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Christopher Mark Taylor appeals from the district court's Judgment 01 Conviction
Upon Plea of Guilty to Two Felony Counts, Count One, Aggravated Battery on a Police

Officer, Idaho Code§§ 18-903, 18-907, 18-915, Count Five, Aggravated Assault on a
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Peach Officer, Idaho Code§§ 18-901, 18-905, 18-915, both counts including both
deadly weapon and persistant violator enhancements; in which the district court
imposed and executed unified sentences of fixed life, no indeterminate, each sentence
to run concurrent. (R., 248-255). Mr. Taylor asserts that, in light of the unique facts of
this case, the sentences are excessive and an abuse of discretion.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Taylor pleaded guilty to Aggravated Battery on a Police Officer as defined in
I.C.§§ 18-903(a), (b) and/or (c), 18-907(1)(a) and/or (b), 18-915(1)(b), with the statutory
firearm enhancement as defined in I.C. § 19-2514, and Aggravated Assault on a Police
Officer as defined in I.C. §§ 18-901(a) and/or (b), 18-905(a) and/or (b) and 18-915(1)(b).
In addition, Mr. Taylor admitted to being a persistent violator as defined in I.C. § 192514. (R., 248-255).
The forgoing statement of facts is summarized from the statement of facts
contained in Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, and were not in dispute. (R., 186187). At approximately 5:00 o'clock pm on February 7, 2011, Mr. Taylor was observed
driving by Jerome City Police Officer Dennis Clark at a speed over the posted speed
limit. Clark recognized Mr. Taylor and was apparently aware that his driving privileges
were suspended at that time. Clark attempted to make a traffic stop. Mr. Taylor did not
stop his vehicle. Instead, his speed gradually increased. Mr. Taylor reached a residence
at 300 South and 51 East in Jerome, Idaho, where the vehicle's driver side door opened
briefly. Officer Clark pulled in about two car lengths behind Mr. Taylor' veLic!e with his
gun drawn and pointed at Mr. Taylor. At that point, the driver's side door again closed,
and the vehicle turned around and began driving to the east on 300 South. (R., 186APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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187).
During the pursuit, Officer Clark momentarily lost sight of the vehic;e

as it came

over a small hill. When he regained sight of the vehicle, it was stopped in the roadway
and Mr. Taylor was standing outside of the vehicle with a shotgun. Officer Clark stopped
his vehicle approximately 50 feet from Mr. Taylor' vehicle and observed Mr. Taylor point
the shotgun at his patrol car. Officer Clark ducked to the right and Mr. Taylor fired one
shot with the shotgun at the patrol car. The officer was struck above the left eye with a
pellet from the shotgun. (R., 186-187).
At that time, Officer Clark rammed the Defendant's vehicle with his patrol car, but
Mr. Taylor returned to his vehicle and began driving back the other direction. At that
point, Officer Clark exited his patrol car and fired several shots at Mr. Taylor. By this
time, several other members of various branches of law enforcement had joined the
pursuit. Jerome City Police Officer Scott Novak had positioned his patrol vehicle so that
Mr. Taylor was driving towards it. The vehicle was located halfway in the roadway and
halfway off the road. Officer Novak had exited his vehicle and positioned himself at the
passenger side rear quarter panel, with his gun drawn in the "ready" position. Officer
Novak would testify that as Mr. Taylor' vehicle was approaching his position; it drifted
from the right lane, towards his vehicle, which was parked on the opposite side of the
road. Officer Novak moved away from his vehicle, to avoid being struck in the event Mr.
Taylor' vehicle struck his patrol car. He then fired two shots at Mr, Taylor' vehicle. (R.,

187).
Mr. Taylor would testify that he saw Officer Novak with his firearm pointed at Mr.
Taylor, and ducked as he was driving by that position, to avoid being shcf in the face or
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head. He never intended to swerve towards Officer Novak. {R., 187).
Officer Clark was still in pursuit of Mr. Taylor' vehicle at that time, and shortly
after made the decision to ram Mr. Taylor' vehicle off the roadway. The vehicle crashed,
and Mr. Taylor was arrested by several officers without significant further :ncident. Mr.
Taylor had been shot in the hand and had serious lacerations on his head. He was
transported to the hospital. (R., 187).
Officer Clark was life-flighted after the incident, and ultimately underwent three
surgeries to remove the BB from above his eye. He remains blind in his left eye. (R.,
187).
Mr. Taylor filed a Rule 35 Motion for reduction of sentence. (R., p.84.)

The

district court denied the motion. (Tr. 3/30/09 pg.9, L.12 - pg.11, L.9; R., p.88.).
Mr. Taylor hired an attorney to file a motion to reconsider the denial of ilis motion
under Rule 35. That attorney did not file formally the motion and affidavit until after the
hearing on the motion for reconsideration. (Tr.3 pg.49, L 1 - pg.54, L.7; R., pgs. 97101.). No apparent action appears in the record from these ·filings.
ISSUES

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed unified sentences of
fixed life in prision, no indeterminate, upon Mr. Taylor following his plea of guilty?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Taylor's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence?

ARGUMENT

I.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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The District Court Abused Its Discretion When lt Imposed Unified Sentence Of Fixed
Life. No Indeterminate Upon Mr. Taylor. Following His Plea Of
Guilty

A.

Introduction
Mr. Taylor's history, and the facts of this case, present mitigating circumstances

indicating a need for temperance in sentencing.

Nevertheless, the district court

imposed six years upon Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor asserts that the district court failed to
adequately consider the mitigating factors and, thus, abused its discretion, considering
Mr. Taylor's lack of criminal history and his personal circumstances.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Unified Sentences Of
Fixed Life, No Indeterminate Upon Mr. Taylor, Following His Plea Of Guilty.

Law Regarding Sentencing.
When fashioning a sentence, the court must consider 1. Protection of society; 2.
Deterrence, both of the individual and the public; 3. Possibility of rehabilitation; and, 4.
Punishment or retribution with the primary consideration being the good order and
protection of society. State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (1982). With these goals in
mind, the court must also have regard for the nature of the offense and

tr.~ character of

the offender. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (1982).
Our Supreme Court has made clear that "to impose a fixed life sentence requires
a h:gh degree of certainty that the perpetrator could never be safely released back into
society or if the offense is so egregious that it demands an exceptionally severe
measure of retribution and deterrence." State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, _ 253 P.3d
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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310, 313 (2011). Mr. Taylor asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentences of
fixed life are excessive beyond the limits of discretion. Where a defendant contends
tha~ the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court
conducts an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 653 P .2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982). The Idaho Supreme
Court states:
the general objectives of sentence review are:

i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having n1gard to
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection
of the public interest;

(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an
opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence;

(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing
power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and

(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing

which are both rational and just.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144-145, 814 P.2d 401, 404-405 (1991), overruled

on

other grounds by State

v.

Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 {1992), (citing

State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384-385, 582 P.2d 728, 730-731 (1978) and quoting ABA

Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences at 7 (Approved Draft 1968)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held, m[w]here a sentence is within
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the court imposing the sentence.'» State
939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997), quoting State

v.

v.

Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294,

Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71,

75 (1979).

Mr. Taylor does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory

maximum.

Rather, Mr. Taylor contends that in light of the governin~ criteria, the

sentence was excessive considering a rational view of the facts. Id., ailing State v.
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145,814 P.2d 401,405 (1991), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992). As noted above, the governing

criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation;
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho
382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).
Given the fact that Mr. Taylor admitted to a persistent v1olator enhancement, the
district court had statutory authority to impose up to a life sentence. Therefore, Mr.
Taylor did not ask for specific sentences for each count. Rather, Mr. Taylor asked this
court to impose a sentence of 15 years fixed, with 15 years indeterminate,, v.·ith the
sentences to be concurrent both with one another and with the sentences in Twin Falls
County Case Nos. CR-2009-12678 and CR-2010-2612. (R., 189).
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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In support of this request, Mr. Taylor cited the following cases with which to
compare to his case:
State v. McE/hiney, Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2008-0660, U.e defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder. Factually, the defendant admitted to murdering
the victim through asphyxiation, over a $250.00 drug debt, and stuffing the body in a
barr'el, to be disposed of at a later date. The Defendant had at least one prior felony for
grand theft, and well over ten prior misdemeanor convictions. On April 10, 2009, he was
sentenced to a unified sentence of life, with 22 years fixed. (R., 189).
In State v. Trevino, Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2010-7621, the defendant
pied guilty to second-degree murder with a deadly weapon enhancement. There, the
district court bound itself to a Rule 11 plea agreement which waived any presentence
investigation, and imposed a unified determinate sentence of 15 years in prison. (R.,
189).
In the recent Jerome County case, State v. Keipper, 2010 Unpublished Opinion
No. 333 (cited for illustrious purposes only and not as legal authority), the district court
sentenced the defendant to a unified term of 6 years with 2 years fixed for involuntary
manslaughter - which had originally been charged as second degree murder. In
Keipper, the defendant had at least seven prior offenses at the time he was sentenced
on the involuntary manslaughter charge. {R., 190).
In State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330 (2009), the defendant shot two police officers
who were attempting to serve a search warrant on the defendant at his residence. Both
officers survived because they were protected by bulletproof vests. The defendant had
a "lengthy criminal record" and "a number of his prior convictions were for ~rimes of
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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violence." These crimes included two separate convictions for kidnapping (one in
Arizona and one in Idaho). The defendant had served prison time on both of these
kidnapping charges. Ultimately, the defendant pied to one count of unlawful possession
of a firearm and one count of aggravated battery on law enforcement officer. The Court
of Appeals held that the sentence was within the bounds of discretion wht>n::the
Defendant's cumulative sentence was .25 years fixed with 5 years indeterminate.
In State v. Gootz, 110 Idaho 807 (1986), the defendant was on parole when he
committed the offense at issue. In Gootz, the Defendant robbed someone at gunpoint.
He then laid in wait for a law enforcement intern who was in pursuit, and shot the intern
in the face as he (the [ntern) looked over the fence. The defendant was convicted
robbery, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm during commission of each
crime. Id. at 809. Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed a unified determinate
sentence of 30 years fixed.
Mr. Taylor argues that although he took full responsibility for his actions, the
totality of facts in his case demonstrated less culpability than any of the above cases.
Rather, in this case, Mr. Taylor unfortunately caused drastic harm through a series of
poor decisions resulting from a lack of thought, and resulting from a variety of mitigating
factors.
This incident was precipitated by a culmination of troubling events in Mr. Taylor'
life which led him to be unstable and suicidal

at that time.

For several days prior to the

events of February 7, Mr. Taylor and his live-in girlfriend, Beth had been having serious
relationship trouble. Mr. Taylor has an extreme substance abuse problem. (PSI, pp. 1617). Mr. Taylor had relapsed into his drug and alcohol addiction; he had been using
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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methamphetamine and drinking steadily for days prior to these events. Mr. Taylor was
also depressed because of a long-term failure in his relationship with his mother. Thus,
Mr. Taylor was very despondent and left the house on the afternoon of February 7,
2011, with the intent of committing suicide. During the time he was being pursued by
Officer Clark, Mr. Taylor called his father, Allan Mark Taylor "Mark", and to!d him that he
was going to kill himself. It was Mark's driveway that Mr. Taylor momentariiy stopped in
during the pursuit (300 South and 51 East in Jerome, Idaho). (PSI, pp. 4-5).
Mr. Taylor immediately showed remorse, and asked whether Officer Clark was all
right. Mr. Taylor gave a full confession of the events of February 7, 2011, and indicated
that he was ready and willing to plead guilty. Although he knew or should have known
that there was a high likelihood of hitting Officer Clark, Mr. Taylor did not intend to fire
directly at Officer Clark, but rather fired at his patrol car. It was Mr. Taylor' hope at the
time that the police officers would shoot and kill him. (PSI, pp. 4-5).
While not minimizing the events of this case, unlike McE/h;ney and Trevino, this
was not a case where a person lost his or her life. Additionally, unlike Gootz and Stone,
or the other above cases, this was not a case where Mr. Taylor had planned or thought
out a criminal act. Rather, this was a case where Mr. Taylor reacted very badly to the
situation he was in and too, part in an unfortunate sequence of events and substance
abuse which led to Mr. Taylor making a horrible decision.
To impose a fixed life sentence requires a high degree of certainty that the
defendant could not be safely released back into society. Windom, 253 P. 3d at 313
(2011). A fixed life sentence should not be used as a judicial hedge against uncertainty.
State v.Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). Rather, it is the role of the Idaho
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Commission for Pardons and Parole that determines when an offender should be
paroled. Protection of society is paramount in this decision, and Commission is best
equipped to make this determination. Parole shall only be ordered "when, in the
discretion of the commission, it is in the best interests of society, and the commission
believes the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law abiding citizen.
LC.§ 20-223{c). More specifically, decisions regarding parole are discretionary and
involve many criteria, including:
1. Seriousness and aggravation and/or mitigation involved in the crime.
2. Prior criminal history of inmate.
3. Failure or success of past probation and parole.
4. Institutional history, to include conformance to established rules, involvement in
programs and jobs, custody level at time of hearing, and overall behavior.
5. Evidence of the development of a positive social attitude and the willlngness to fulfill
the obligations of a good citizen.
6. Information or reports regarding physical or psychological condition.
7. The strength and stability of the proposed parole plan, including adequate home
placement and employment or maintenance and care.
lDAPA 50.01 .01. Additionally, the victim of any crime may fully participate- and give
testimony at any parole hearing. Id.
Mr. Taylor contends that the Commission for Pardons and Parole is in the best
pos!tion to determine when and whether a prisoner should be paroled. The Commission
makes a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors at the time an inmate is being
considered for parole. Therefore, Mr. Taylor contends that the district court should have
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impose a reasonable determinate sentence of 15 years and allow the Commission for
Pa1dons and Parole to make the determination as to when and if Mr. Taylor should be
paroled. To have done otherwise constituted an impermissible "judicial hedge against
uncertainty" and therefore an abuse of discretion.
Mitigating Factors Must Be Considered.
There are several mitigating factors this Court must consider when sentencing
the Defendant.
Mr. Taylor's substance abuse and mental health issues must be considered.
He had a history of use of Marijuana at the age of 8, methamphetamine ~; the age of
12. (PSI, pp. 16-17). He has been making bad choices his whole life because of
substance abuse. (PSI, Mental Health Assessment, pp. 2, 16). The LMSW Marjean
Flowers-Hazen opined that the core issues appear to be around Mr. Taylor's continued
use of substances. Mr. Taylor has been using illegal substances since a very young age
and he does not appear to have a very long period of time when he has been in the
community when he has not used illegal substances. She recommended that Mr. Taylor
receive substance abuse treatment as well as other classes that might be offered such
as CSC or MRT. (PSI, Mental Health Assessment, p 17).
Further, it must be noted that of the Mr. Taylor's prior offenses, 19 cases have
been dismissed in their entirety. (PSI, pp. 5-11). All cases dismissed in thAir entirety
should not be considered or weighed against Mr. Taylor. Of the remaining cases, 21 are
simple driving offenses. Of those driving offenses, 16 are convictions for either Failure
to Purchase a Driver's License or Driving Without Privileges. (PSI., pp. 5-11). When Mr.
Taylor's criminal record is fully analyzed, it is apparent that the district court abused its
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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discretion when imposing fixed life.
Additionally, the issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses
remorse has been addressed in several cases. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824
P.2d 135 {Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is
required when the defendant has expressed uremorse for his conduct, his recognition of
his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his
character." Id. at 209, 824 P.2d at 140. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a
defendant's term of imprisonment because the defendant expressed regret for what he
had done. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,595, 65'1 P.2d 527,529 (1982).
ln this case, Mr. Taylor has fully accepted responsibility for his actions and is
extremely remorseful for his actions.
Mr. Taylor has stated to this Court that: I think about that day every day & if I
could go back & change my choices I made that day I would but I can't & I'm sorry I
wasn't myseff that day & I wish that day never happened. I've never cried so much in my
life & I hate myself every day that I wake up in jail and think about how much pain I've
caused everyone. (PSI p. 18).
Prosecutor's Statements re: appearance.
Counsel for Mr. Taylor objected to the prosecutor's repeated statements
regarding tattoos, and Mr. Taylor's appearance during his argument at sentencing. (Tr.,
p. 62, L 15 -

p. 63, L.24.). Mr. Taylor contends that those comments constituted an

improper inflammatory attack, and bordered on attempted testimony by th<:: prosecutor
regarding the meaning of the tattoos. (See prosecutor's remarks at Tr., p.42, L.19 - 43,
L.5; p.46, lines 16-22.). The State's inflammatory comments argued essentially for a
APPELLANTS BRIEF
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sentence based on revenge, rather than based on the permissible sentencing factors.
The district court considered the tattoos, noting that it did not sentence "for
tattoos", but that the words within the tattoos indicated a lack of respect for i:>dlf, society,
and authority to the district court. (Tr., p.85, lines 2-13.). Though the district court
indicated it did not sentence for tattoos, it went on to draw a conclusion about Mr. Taylor
based on the tattoos. Mr. Taylor submits that this displays an abuse of discretion, and
sentencing based on a lack of the exercise of reason, and demonstrates that the district
court sentenced based on inflammatory factors and an argument based on revenge and
other impermissible factors. Therefore, the sentence should be overturned.
In sum, in light of the facts of the his case and of his personal circumstances, and
in light of the conduct of the sentencing hearing herein, Mr. Taylor asserts that the
district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors, considered improper
factors, failed to exericise reason and, thus, abused its discretion.

11.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Taylor's Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The Sentence Was
Excessive As Initially Imposed

A

Introduction

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Counsel for Mr. Taylor did not present any new information in support of the Rule

35 motion for a reduction of sentence. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor asserts that the dfstrict
court abused its discretion when it denied the motion because his s~ntence was
excessive as initially imposed.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Taylor Idaho

Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The
Sentence Was Excessive As Initially Imposed

A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125
Idaho 251,253,869 P.2d 568,570 (Ct.App.1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21,
740 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869
{Ct.App.1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 Idaho a 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction, Id,, citing

State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct.App.1991).
Counsel for Mr. Taylor did not submit any new information or documentation in
support of his Rule 35 motion. Therefore, he respectfully contends that the district court
should have reduced his sentence pursuant to the Rule 35 motion because the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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sentence was excessive as originally imposed because the court should have allowed
him more time to secure treatment out on probation. His arguments in support of this
assertion are found above, and need not be repeated. They are incorporated herein by
reference.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Taylor respectfully requests that this court reduce his sentenca as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule

35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this _I_ day of February, 2013.

S PHEN . THOMPSON
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this_(_ day of February, 2013, caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be delivered via U.S. First
Class Mail to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court for:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720w0010

ST PHEN D. THOMPSON
State Appellate Public Defender
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